Army force, regardless of size or composition, the Marines and their officers’ performance notably improved, when compared to fighting alongside an inexperienced Army force.
However, when incorporated alongside an experienced U.S. In an overall assessment of Marines’ performance ashore, when led by naval officers-as was often the case-Marines performed poorly. The Marine Corps’ lackluster battlefield performance ashore during the Civil War is best understood by examining their poor organization in officer selection, recruiting and retention, ad hoc formations larger than company size, limited collective tactical training, and experience in large-scale ground combat. On rare occasions, extremely small-scale and short in duration and distance, Marines engaged in land operations, and on even rarer occasions they conducted land-based or amphibious operations involving more than one company. Navy, both guarding shipyards and protecting naval crews from hostile boarding, as well as serving as backup gun crews or as boarding parties and deck sharpshooters during close fighting, while enforcing discipline when afloat. Marines served primarily in a security role for the U.S. Marine Corps’ role in the American Civil War largely followed that of its previous service, lacking much distinction in new roles or tactical application. Marines, large-scale ground combat, ad hoc formations, tactical training, Marine performance ashore Army officers, to analyze Marines’ battlefield performance ashore. The focus of this study is on large-scale Marine land operations, involving battalion-size elements assembled on an ad hoc basis and led by either U.S. Marines rarely engaged in land operations and even more rarely conducted land-based or amphibious operations involving more than one company. Abstract: During the American Civil War, U.S.
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